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Abstract Recent experimental evidence in experience-
based decision-making suggests that people are more risk
seeking in the gains domain relative to the losses domain.
This critical result is at odds with the standard reflection
effect observed in description-based choice and explained
by Prospect Theory. The so-called reversed-reflection effect
has been predicated on the extreme-outcome rule, which
suggests that memory biases affect risky choice from expe-
rience. To test the general plausibility of the rule, we
conducted two experiments examining how the magnitude
of prospective outcomes impacts risk preferences. We found
that while the reversed-reflection effect was present with
small-magnitude payoffs, using payoffs of larger magni-
tude brought participants’ behavior back in line with the
standard reflection effect. Our results suggest that risk pref-
erences in experience-based decision-making are not only
affected by the relative extremeness but also by the absolute
extremeness of past events.
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Introduction
Most studies to date on decision-making under risk have
focused on one-shot decision paradigms, where participants
are given explicit verbal descriptions about the outcomes
and their associated probabilities for each choice alternative
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). The past 10 years or so have seen a surge of
interest in experiential decision-making, where information
about each alternative (i.e., outcomes and probabilities) is
inferred/learned through repeated experience (see e.g., Bar-
ron & Erev, 2003). While these two paradigms present par-
ticipants with identical information for each decision alter-
native, past research has highlighted robust contrasts regard-
ing risk preferences and decision patterns between the two
decision modalities, suggesting a description-experience
“gap” in risky choice (Camilleri & Newell, 2011; Hertwig,
Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
The most well-studied aspect of the “gap” is the differen-
tial treatment of rare events (i.e., p < 0.20). For example,
consider the choice between an option which returns $3 with
certainty and a risky option which returns $4 with p = 0.8,
and nothing otherwise. Here the rare event is the .20 chance
of receiving nothing. In description-based choice, the major-
ity of participants prefer the certain option because they
treat rare events as if they had a higher probability of occur-
rence, suggesting an “overweighting” of those events. In
contrast, experience-based studies have documented that
rare events are “underweighted”, thus leading most people
to choose the risky option in the above example (Hertwig
et al., 2004).
Recently, Ludvig and Spetch (2011) showed that descrip-
tion and experience-based choice do not only diverge with
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regards to rare events, but also when the risky option offers
equiprobable (50–50%) outcomes. In two experiments, they
observed that in experience-based choice, participants are
more risk-seeking (i.e., clear preference for the risky option)
in the gain relative to the loss domain (see also Ludvig,
Madan, & Spetch, 2014; Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch, 2014).
This behavioral pattern is at odds with the well-documented
reflection effect in description-based choice, which sug-
gests a switch from risk-aversion in the gain domain to
risk-seeking in the loss domain.1 For example, most people
prefer a certain win of $200 over a risky option offer-
ing $400 with 50% (gain domain; prospects have identical
expected values). However, when these two prospects are
framed as losses, people tend to prefer the risky option
(hoping for a 50% chance of losing nothing) over the cer-
tain loss (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This standard
reflection effect is usually attributed to a non-linear utility
function characterized by diminishing sensitivity. This func-
tion captures the idea that the subjective impact of change
in the received payoffs diminishes with the distance from
zero (as in the utility function of Prospect Theory, which
is concave for gains and convex for losses; see Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979). In contrast, the reversed-reflection
effect, documented by Ludvig and colleagues, presents an
inversion of the basic scheme of risk preferences observed
in description-based choice. When participants learn the
outcomes and probabilities of each choice option through
repeated experience, they show higher selection rates from
the risky option in the gain domain relative to the loss
domain (where they prefer the certain medium loss, e.g.,
$200, over the risk of losing a higher amount, 50% of losing
$400; see also Table 1).
The question then is what generates the reversed-reflection
effect in experience-based choice? According to Madan
et al. (2014), the effect is found because people tend to bet-
ter recall salient past events and ascribe more importance to
them. Particularly in the context of risky decision-making,
this bias makes people more “sensitive to the biggest gains
and losses they encounter” (Madan et al., 2014, p. 629).
Considering the previous gamble, the prospect of win-
ning $400 or losing the same amount (i.e., best and worst
outcomes in the decision context, respectively) is over-
weighted in memory, thus leading to more selections from
the risky option in the gain domain ($400, 0.5; 0  $200,
1), and at the same time, more selections from the certain
1This applies to situations where the probabilities are high. When
probabilities are small, the opposite pattern is observed: risk seeking
in the gain domain and risk aversion in the loss domain, leading to the
well-documented four-fold pattern of risk preferences in description-
based decision-making (see e.g., Tversky & Fox, 1995).
option in the loss domain (-$400, 0.5; 0 ≺ -$200, 1).2 The
differential impact of extreme payouts is captured by what
Madan, Ludvig, and Spetch (2017) describe as the extreme-
outcome rule. In a nutshell, this rule states that people seek
the option which returns the “best” outcome in a given
context and avoid the option which returns the “worst”
outcome.
One key characteristic of demonstrating the reversed-
reflection effect in experience-based choice is the inter-
mixing of gain and loss decision trials within the same
experimental task: participants on each trial are presented
with a choice pair (certain and risky options) framed as
either gains or losses (the Method section and for more
details see, Ludvig et al., 2014). This intermixing of gain
and loss trials appears to be crucial because when partic-
ipants are presented with decision trials in a block-wise
manner (repeated play from the gain trials followed by
the loss trials or vice-versa), then the standard reflection
effect is observed (see Erev, Ert, & Yechiam, 2008; Ert &
Yechiam, 2010; Ludvig et al., 2014).
However, even when the standard reflection effect is
observed, it is moderated by the magnitude of the prospec-
tive outcomes, in a way that lower or higher nominal payoffs
affect people’s risk preferences. For example, Erev et al.
(2008) found in an experience-based choice experiment that
when participants were presented with low nominal payoffs,
they exhibited risk neutrality (i.e., no apparent preference
for either the certain or the risky option, an effect that can
be accounted for by a linear utility function), but when the
payoffs were multiplied by a factor of 100, the diminishing
sensitivity and the typical reflection effects were observed.
The increase in risk aversion with high nominal payoffs is
the basis of the “incentive” effect (Holt and Laury, 2002);
according to this effect, people become relatively more risk
averse when they are presented with higher payoff options.
Similarly, the “peanuts” effect suggests that people prefer
the risky option when the stakes are relatively low, thus
becoming more risk averse with high-magnitude payoffs
(e.g., Markowitz, 1952; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). The
reflection of the “peanuts” effect in the loss domain indi-
cates higher risk seeking with high nominal payoffs (Weber
& Chapman, 2005).
The fact that the standard reflection effect is moder-
ated by the magnitude of the prospective outcomes raises
2For the demonstration of two-outcome gambles we use the notation
“x, p; y” which indicates that outcome x occurs with probability p,
and outcome y with probability 1−p. For choice between two options
and preference notation, we use the following symbols: A | B indi-
cates a choice between A or B; ∼ for indifference;  or  for weak
preference;  or ≺ for strong preference.
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the question of how the reversed-reflection effect might be
impacted by magnitude. Ludvig et al. (2014) observed the
reversed-reflection effect using low-magnitude payoffs: a
certain option which returned 20 points (or a loss of the
same amount in the loss domain) and a risky option with a
50% chance of receiving 40 points (or a loss of the same
points; and 0 otherwise). In fact, most of the experiments
investigating the extreme-outcome rule used low-magnitude
payoffs (see Ludvig, Madan, & Spetch, 2015; Ludvig &
Spetch, 2011; Madan et al., 2014, 2017), showing risk neu-
trality/risk seeking in the gain domain and risk aversion
in the loss domain. A strong interpretation of the extreme-
outcome rule is that the magnitude of the prospective gains
and losses in a given decision context should have no effect
on people’s risk preferences; the most extreme outcomes
should moderate decision-making behavior, regardless of
how small or large they are. Based on the previous example,
if the risky option offers 4,000 points instead of 40 points
(or a loss of the same amount), it should not impact choice
behavior, as people would seek the best outcome in the
context (i.e., 4,000; hence showing risk seeking) and avoid
the worst outcome (i.e., −4,000; showing risk aversion, see
Table 1).
Table 1 outlines the two competing hypotheses: based on
diminishing sensitivity the magnitude of the nominal pay-
offs should moderate people’s risk preferences given the
assumption that higher-magnitude payoffs should make par-
ticipants more risk averse in the gain domain and more
risk seeking in the losses domain. On the other hand, a
strong interpretation of the extreme outcome rule predicts
the same pattern of risk preferences regardless of outcome
magnitude: more risk seeking in the gain domain relative
to the loss domain. We set out to test these two contra-
dictory accounts using the same methodology as in Ludvig
et al.’s (2014) study; that is, presenting participants with
Table 1 Behavioral choice effects predicted by diminishing sensitiv-
ity and the extreme-outcome rule across domain (gains and losses) and
payoff magnitude
Diminishing sensitivity Extreme-outcome
Domain
Gains Risk aversion Risk seeking
Losses Risk seeking Risk aversion
Reflection effect Reversed-reflection effect
Magnitude Gains Losses Gains Losses
Small PR PR PR PR
∨ ∧ = =
Large PR PR PR PR
Peanuts or incentive effect
Note: PR proportion of risky choices
intermixed gain and loss choices. Thus, the main question is
whether the extreme outcome rule is truly insensitive to the
magnitude of the offered payoffs.
Experiments 1 and 2
We present two experiments that investigate whether the
extreme-outcome rule is invariant to changes in nominal
payoff. The experiments described here are analogous to the
design used by Ludvig et al. (2014).3
Method
Participants All participants were undergraduate psychology
students and recruited via an online system (Experiment 1:
N = 98, 71% Female, Mage = 18.9 years, SD = 1.8;
Experiment 2: N = 104, 65% Female, Mage = 19.2 years,
SD = 1.6). They were allocated course credit for par-
ticipation. Participants in Experiment 2 could also earn a
maximum of $16 based on their performance in the task.
Task and procedure Participants completed a comput-
erized experience-based choice task where the goal was
to maximize the total number of points earned by click-
ing on colored squares. There were three types of trials:
decision, catch, and single trials (see Fig. 1). In decision tri-
als, participants were presented with two colored squares,
which represented a choice between a certain and a risky
option framed as either gains or losses. The certain option
always returned the same payoff (+/ − 20, 1) each time
it was selected, whereas the risky option produced one of
two equally likely payoffs (+/ − 40, 0.5; 0; both options
have the same expected value = +/ − 20). Hence, there
were four possible color/option squares (i.e., gains-certain,
gains-risky, losses-certain, losses-risky). The contingency
between colors and options remained invariant throughout
each experimental session but was randomized across par-
ticipants. Participants were also presented with two colored
squares that consisted of a choice between a gain option
(certain or risky) and a loss option (certain or risky). These
catch trials permitted an evaluation of whether participants
3The only aesthetic differences between our experiments and Ludvig
et al.’s (2014) experiments were that (a) instead of presenting pictures
of colored doors, our participants were presented with colored squares,
and (b) we did not utilize cartoon graphics (e.g., a pot of gold for a pos-
itive outcome and a thief for a negative outcome) for the presentation
of the outcome feedback. This was presented in black font (regardless
of whether it was a positive or a negative outcome) after participants
had clicked a colored square. Experiment scripts, datasets, and analy-
sis scripts are available online on the Open Science Framework (OSF)
website: https://osf.io/z57tn/
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Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the experimental design: a Deci-
sion trials (gain or loss domain) consisted of choices between a certain
(+/ − 20, 1) and a risky option (+/ − 40, 0.5; 0). b Catch trials con-
sisted of a choice between a gain (certain or risky) and a loss option
(certain or risky), and ensured that participants had learned the correct
color/option association. c Single doors ensured that all options had
been experienced
had learned the correct color/option association. Following
Ludvig et al. (2014), an exclusion criterion was set that
removed any participants that failed to select the gain square
on less than 60% of the catch trials.4 Finally, participants
were presented with only a single square (single trials). The
square had to be clicked in order to continue and ensured
that all squares had been experienced.
The main experimental manipulation was the magnitude
of the prospective payoffs: Participants in both experiments
were randomly assigned to one of four magnitude con-
ditions where the original payoffs (M1 = 20; 40) were
multiplied by a factor of 0.1 (M0.1 = 2; 4), 10 (M10 = 200;
400), or 100 (M100 = 2,000; 4,000).
Following Ludvig et al. (2014), participants completed
five blocks of 48 trials. Each block randomly intermixed
the three different trial types and consisted of 24 decision
trials (12 gain; 12 loss), 16 catch trials, and eight single tri-
als (each square presented twice) for a total of 240 trials.
Squares were presented on each side of the screen equally
often. Points were accrued or lost on each of the 240 trials,
with the overall expected value on decision and single tri-
als equal to 0. Only on catch trials could participants gain
points. Once a square had been clicked, feedback was pro-
vided immediately, indicating how many points had been
gained or lost, and stayed visible on the screen until partic-
ipants clicked on a “Proceed” button to advance to the next
trial of the task. No feedback about the unselected box was
4Based on this criterion, we excluded the data from one participant in
Experiment 1 and two participants in Experiment 2.
provided (partial feedback procedure). The points tally was
updated and visible throughout the experiment.5
During Experiment 1, participants accrued only points
and were instructed to earn as many as possible throughout
the session. Participants in Experiment 2 were similarly told
to maximize the number of points earned, but that each point
was also worth a nominal amount of money. The conversion
rate in Experiment 2 was determined by the magnitude con-
dition to which the participant was assigned. Specifically,
participants in conditions M0.1, M1, and M10 received 0.1
cents per point whereas participants in the M100 condition
received 0.01 cents per point.
These conversion rates, however, resulted in varying
degrees of accumulated wealth across payoff conditions. To
balance out the net earnings, each participant in Experiment 2
completed a second experimental session to top up their
winnings. Participants were told that all accrued money
from the first session was safe. For these “top up” ses-
sions, the task was identical to that of the first session, only
the color of the squares changed to avoid confusion with
the previous set of colors. Each participant was assigned
to a new magnitude condition. Specifically, participants in
conditions M0.1 and M1 continued (randomly allocated) to
either M10 or M100 (and vice-versa). The conversion rate
remained unchanged between sessions.
Results
We are interested in two main aspects of the data6: first, is
the reversed-reflection effect reliable under the conditions
tested by Ludvig et al. (2014), and second, if so, does mag-
nitude moderate participants’ risk preferences (see Table 1
for the pattern of results predicted by each account)? Fig. 2
presents the proportion of risky choices (PR) across the two
5At the end of the repeated-choice experiment, participants were given
a policy setting task where they could distribute their choices across
100 imaginary future and non-consequential trials. This constitutes a
preference elicitation method whereby exploration and/or payoff pat-
tern exploitation are irrelevant (see Ashby, Konstantinidis, & Yechiam,
2017). Participants were shown two options (as in the decision trials
setting) and told that they would have to make another 100 choices,
but this time indicating what proportion of the 100 choices they would
allocate to the certain or risky options. The policy task was presented
twice, separately for gains and losses options. Each option was pre-
sented with a default value of 50 trials. Results from this assessment
are presented in the Appendix.
6We note here that while participants in Experiment 2 completed two
experimental sessions, we consider only the data from the first ses-
sion. The reason for this is that the context for the second session
had changed dramatically and each participant began the second ses-
sion with varying degrees of accumulated wealth. These changes make
predictions about the nature of context and what now counts as an
extreme outcome rather complex. We thus refrain from speculative and
exploratory analyses of these data. The data are, however, available on
OSF.
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Fig. 2 Proportion of risky choices (PR) across domains (x-axis: gain/loss) and magnitude conditions (columns) in Experiments 1 and 2 (rows).
Error bars indicate ±1 SEM
domains (gain: PRG and loss: PRL) and the four magni-
tude levels, separately for Experiments 1 and 2. An initial
inspection of the figure suggests that magnitude appears to
have an effect on people’s risk preferences (i.e., the relative
heights of the green and red bars change as reward mag-
nitude changes). We analyzed PR using a logit generalized
mixed-effects model7 (Bates, Ma¨chler, Bolker, & Walker,
2015), predicting selection of the risky option, with domain
(gains, losses; within-subjects) and magnitude (four levels
- polynomial contrasts; between-subjects) as fixed-effects
and random intercepts for each participant. The main con-
trast of interest is the interaction (linear contrast) between
domain and magnitude: according to the diminishing sen-
sitivity hypothesis, we should find a pattern of results con-
sistent with the extreme-outcome rule in the low-magnitude
conditions (higher risk seeking in gains compared to losses),
but we should see the standard reflection effect in the
high-magnitude conditions.
The analysis of the Experiment 1 data revealed a signif-
icant interaction, χ2(3) = 23.99, p < .001, suggesting that
relative risk taking between the gain and loss domains
is moderated by payoff magnitude. More specifically, we
found that the linear contrast was significant, b = −0.39,
z = −4.81, p < .001, Profile Likelihood (PL) 95% CI
[−0.58,−0.23], suggesting a steady decrease of the
reversed-reflection effect across magnitude conditions. In
other words, while the reversed-reflection effect is observed
in the low-magnitude conditions, the relative difference
between risk taking in gains and losses shrinks as we move
to payoffs of higher magnitude, and even reverses (i.e., back in
line with the standard reflection effect - albeit, non-significant)
in the highest-magnitude condition. We followed up the
significant interaction with pairwise mixed-effects logit
7We did not use the traditional general linear model type of anal-
yses (e.g., ANOVA and t test) because the dependent variable is
binary/categorical.
regressions (four in total; adjusting p values for multi-
ple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure),
comparing PR between the gain and the loss domain in each
magnitude level: we found that in the two low-magnitude
conditions the results are consistent with the extreme-
outcome rule (M0.1: PRG − PRL, the difference in the PR
between gain and loss domain = 9.27%, b = 0.45, z =
5.34, p < .001, PL 95% CI [0.28, 0.61]; M1: PRG −
PRL = 6.46%, b = 0.29, z = 3.68, p < .001, PL 95%
CI [0.14, 0.45]), showing more risk seeking in gains than
losses, but not in the two high-magnitude conditions (M10:
PRG − PRL = 3.20%, b = 0.16, z = 1.98, p = .06, PL
95% CI [0.001, 0.32]; M100: PRG − PRL = −1.93%, b =
−0.08, z = −1.12, p = .26, PL 95% CI [−0.24, 0.06]).
In Experiment 2, conducting the same analysis as in
Experiment 1, we observed a significant interaction between
domain and magnitude, χ2(3) = 111.12, p < .001, with
reliable linear and quadratic effects (blinear = −0.62, z =
−8.07, p < .001, PL 95% CI [−0.77,−0.47], bquadratic =
−0.25, z = −3.23, p < .001, PL 95% CI [−0.40,−0.10]).
We followed up the significant interaction with pair-
wise mixed-effects logit regressions: the reversed-reflection
effect is present in conditions M0.1 (PRG − PRL = 11.28%,
b = 0.49, z = 6.58, p < .001, PL 95% CI [0.35, 0.64]) and
M10 (PRG − PRL = 8.53%, b = 0.41, z = 5.18, p < .001,
PL 95% CI [0.25, 0.56]), suggesting higher risk seeking in
the gain domain compared to the loss domain. Even though
the results in conditionM1 are not seemingly consistent with
the extreme-outcome rule (i.e., the contrast did not reveal
reliable differences; PRG − PRL = 1.18%, b = 0.04, z =
0.65, p = .52, PL 95% CI [−0.10, 0.20]), it is important to
note that we observed the reversed-reflection effect in this
condition (thus, replicating the results in Ludvig et al., 2014)
when we analyzed the last two choice blocks (PRG−PRL =
10.07%, b = 0.47, z = 3.68, p < .001). In the highest-
magnitude condition, there was a reliable difference in risk
taking behavior, but this time in the opposite direction, with
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Fig. 3 Individual difference scores (PRG − PRL) across magnitude
conditions and experiments. Each marker represents a single partic-
ipant. Red markers indicate higher risk seeking in gains than losses
and blue markers indicate higher risk seeking in losses than gains. Cir-
cles represent difference scores across all experimental trials whereas
triangles refer to the last experimental block. Numbers on top of each
line of points represent the proportion of participants who showed
behavior consistent with the predictions of the extreme-outcome rule.
Darker colored markers indicate overlapping difference scores of
multiple participants
more risk seeking in the loss domain compared to the gain
domain (i.e., the standard reflection effect, see Table 1;
PRG−PRL = −11.54%, b = −0.55, z = −6.99, p < .001,
PL 95% CI [−0.71,−0.40]).
Figure 3 investigates the relationship between magnitude
and relative risk taking behavior on the individual level. The
plot shows the difference in the proportion of risky choices
(PRG−PRL) between the gain and loss domains across mag-
nitude conditions in Experiments 1 and 2. The figure also
presents the difference in the last block (triangle markers). It
is evident that the proportion of participants showing behav-
ior consistent with the extreme-outcome rule decreases as
the magnitude of the prospective wins and losses increases.
It is of interest to note that more participants show higher
risk seeking for gains compared to losses in the last stages
of the task, but in the highest-magnitude conditions, the
proportion does not exceed 0.5.
General discussion
The extreme-outcome rule (or slight modifications thereof)
offers a psychologically plausible and parsimonious expla-
nation for a range of observed effects in experiential choice,
including the reversed-reflection effect. It has been pro-
posed as a possible explanation for behavioral effects where
salient events tend to get overweighted (see e.g., Rigoli, Rut-
ledge, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016; Tsetsos, Chater, & Usher,
2012; Zeigenfuse, Pleskac, & Liu, 2014), and as a rational
means to account for limited cognitive resources in decision-
making under risk and uncertainty (Lieder, Griffiths, &
Hsu, 2017). In two experiments (experiment-point and
financially incentivized), we tested the idea that the mag-
nitude of prospective outcomes plays a role in determining
risk preferences. To date, the extreme outcome rule has only
been observed in contexts where the relative payoffs are of
low magnitude. Despite this, the rule appears to imply that
risk preferences should remain unchanged regardless of the
magnitude of the payoffs. Consistent with the diminishing
sensitivity assumption in Prospect Theory and analogous to
documented effects in the literature (i.e., “incentive” and
“peanuts”; see also Erev et al., 2008), we predicted that the
absolute “extremeness” of extreme outcomes should mod-
erate risk preferences. Our results supported this prediction
and offer a new avenue for extending the discussion and
explanations surrounding overweighting of extreme/salient
events/outcomes.
We replicated Ludvig and Spetch’s (2011) original find-
ing and observed the reversed-reflection effect using the
same nominal payoffs. However, across both experiments
risk preferences were not identical across all of the mag-
nitude conditions. The primary effect, seen in both experi-
ments, was a linearly decreasing proportion of risky choices
in the gains domain as a function of payoff magnitude.
Results from the Policy Task (which are presented in the
Appendix) closely match the results and conclusions from
the analyses of choice data in Experiments 1 and 2. This pat-
tern was more pronounced in the second experiment when
participants were incentivized with money rather than non-
consequential points. Critically, in the highest-magnitude
condition—where payoffs were multiplied by a factor of
100—there was evidence for a statistically significant rever-
sal in risk preferences. Our primary finding, then, is that
the evidence in favor of the extreme-outcome rule seems to
diminish in contexts where the nominal payoffs are much
larger, and that risk preference is not as simple as a tendency
to favor the most extreme outcomes within a particular
decision context. The absolute extremeness of payoffs
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seems to regulate risk preferences too, especially when
incentivized payoffs are used.
Potential explanations and future directions
How should our results be interpreted in light of the competing
accounts outlined in Table 1? One possibility is that rather
than an “either/or”, the notion of a bias toward extreme
outcomes and some form of diminishing sensitivity are required
to explain the results. Assuming that choices in risky decisions
from experience follow a (evidently) biased (for example,
due to underweighting of rare events, see Hertwig & Erev,
2009) multiplicative integration (i.e., expected value calcu-
lation) of observed outcomes and learned probabilities (see
Erev, Ert, Plonsky, Cohen, & Cohen, 2017; Gonzalez &
Dutt, 2011), then a choice bias for the extreme events can
be manifested either on the numerical value of the outcome
(i.e., utility function), or the objective probabilities (i.e.,
probability weighting function), or it can affect both.
One explanation lies in the extreme events having an
additive and constant effect on the utility of extreme
outcomes across magnitude levels. Specifically, for each
outcome we assume a power utility function with dimin-
ishing sensitivity, u(oi) = oαi with 0 < α < 1,
whereas for extreme outcomes, u(oE) = (oE + κ)α ,
where κ is the constant bias added to the value of the
extreme outcome. As diminishing sensitivity and concav-
ity (convexity for losses) of the curve increases with
the magnitude of the payoff, it can be shown that
the absolute distance between (oE + κ)α and oαE (that
is, the “unbiased” utility of an extreme outcome) is
closer to κ when payoff magnitude is low. The absolute
size of κ determines the switch from relative extrem-
ity to absolute extremity driving choice and risk pref-
erences. Alternatively, the value of κ may be deter-
mined by its own functional form, which could be a
context-dependent utility transformation, u(oE) = (oE +
f (oE))
α .
The present results could also be explained via a sin-
gle utility function with multiple inflection points (see
Markowitz, 1952; Weber & Chapman, 2005). This is the
idea that the utility function can be concave and convex
within a domain (gains or losses) and magnitude defines
the switch (i.e., inflection point) from one functional form
to the other. For example, in the gain domain a convex
utility function for small gains can account for increased
risk seeking whereas for larger gains it becomes concave
(accounting for risk aversion and showing diminishing sen-
sitivity). Similarly, for small losses the utility function is
concave (showing risk aversion) but it becomes convex with
losses of higher magnitude. However, while this account
can explain a magnitude effect, it leaves unaccounted evi-
dence from previous research (e.g., Madan et al., 2014)
which showed that extreme events are over-represented in
measures of memory recall as compared to non-extreme
events of equal expected value.
Alternatively, the overweighting of extreme events in
memory might reflect or be the product of overestimation of
objective probabilities of occurrence, in a way that the sub-
jective decision weight for objective probability p = 0.50
is greater than .50, w(.50) > .50. This indicates that the
extremity of these events makes them seem more probable
than they are. The overestimation of p = 0.50 is inconsis-
tent with Prospect Theory which assumes underweighting of
medium probability events (see also Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt,
& L’Haridon, 2008). However, previous research in deci-
sions from experience has found that the relative frequency
of extreme events (as compared to non-extremes) is over-
estimated (see Madan et al., 2014). If the effect of extreme
outcomes on subjective probabilities across magnitude lev-
els is constant (i.e., no interactions between utility and
probability weighting), then in light of the present results,
our magnitude manipulation appears to affect the shape
of the utility function, with outcomes of higher magnitude
leading to strong diminishing sensitivity. This is consistent
with findings in decisions from experience (see Erev et al.,
2008; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005; Yechiam & Ert, 2007),
suggesting linear utility functions with low-magnitude out-
comes (i.e., α = 1), but strong diminishing sensitivity with
high-magnitude outcomes. The notion that the extremity of
an outcome distorts and weights each outcome’s associated
probability is a core component of Lieder et al.’s (2017)
utility-weighted sampling model.
Future research can shed more light on the psychological
and behavioral plausibility of the aforementioned expla-
nations. One interesting avenue is to collect retrospective
memory judgments on the occurrence of these events for
each magnitude level (as in Madan et al., 2014, 2017).
This will provide further evidence as to which account
can capture the interaction between relative extreme events
and absolute outcome magnitude. One important consid-
eration pertinent to the aforementioned accounts is that
they assume that participants have a complete and perfect
representation of each option’s outcomes and associated
probabilities (in other words, perfect learning and memory).
However, this is hardly the case as previous research in deci-
sions from experience has shown that choice behavior is
moderated by recency effects (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004),
sequential dependencies (e.g., Plonsky, Teodorescu, & Erev,
2015), exploration versus exploitation (e.g., Mehlhorn et
al., 2015), and the search for predictable outcome patterns
(e.g., Ashby et al., 2017; Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy,
2002). To that end, future work would benefit from the
inclusion of computational modeling approaches which can
provide insight into the interplay between memory biases,
diminishing sensitivity, recency effects, and the possible
Psychon Bull Rev
differential weighting of extreme outcomes and extreme
probabilities. Erev et al. (2008) incorporated a utility func-
tion in their model of experience based choice (see also Ahn,
Busemeyer, Wagenmakers, & Stout, 2008; Speekenbrink &
Konstantinidis, 2015; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005), and
noted that “the addition of diminishing sensitivity assump-
tion to models that assume oversensitivity to small samples
can improve the value of these models” (p. 587). Our results
corroborate this statement by reinforcing the necessity to
include utility functions in any future attempt to model
specific effects in decisions from experience.
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Appendix: Policy Task
Inspection of the data from the policy task largely confirms
the patterns observed in the choice task (see Fig. 4). In
Experiment 1, the analysis (logit generalized mixed-effects
model with domain and magnitude as fixed effects and ran-
dom intercepts for each participant) revealed a significant
magnitude × domain interaction, χ2(3) = 160.51, p <
.001, indicating that participants’ policies were consistent
with the reversed-reflection effect in the small-magnitude
conditions (M0.1 and M1), but they were in line with the
typical reflection effect in the large-magnitude conditions
(M10 and M100; all mixed-effects t tests were significant,
p < .05).
In Experiment 2, the interaction between magnitude and
domain was significant, χ2(3) = 142.50, p < .001,
which was mainly driven by the differences in the small-
est and largest-magnitude conditions (M0.1 and M100, p <
.001). This pattern is consistent with the idea that the mag-
nitude moderates risk preferences. The middle conditions,
M1 and M10, did not reveal any difference between policies
in the gain and loss domains.
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